Dalton, Flanagan & Beck - Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies

s. 105-107: Beskriver upplösning av "traditional cleavages".

s. 107: "the moderation of social and partisan conflict did stimulate significant changes in the West German electorate. The lessning of partisan conflicts freed a substantial sector of society from the traditional social bases of the party system. New partisan ties were created by individuals who were only marginally tied to traditional social networks or who were strongly influenced by new political concerns.

The most noticable example of this partisan change were the new middle class of white-collar employees and civil servants (Lipset, 1964; Baker et al., 1981: Chap. 7; Dahrendorf 1967). The new middle class exemplifies the shift of the labor force towards service, government, and technology. The political importance of the new middle class derive from its ambiguous position in the traditional bourgeoisie/proletariat class structure. The separation of management from capital creates a social stratum that neither owns nor produces capital. The new middle class finds itself with a position in the social structure that places it between the working class and the old middle class of shopkeepers, business owners, and free professionals. Consequently, the new middle class is integrated neither in the unionized working-class nor the old middle-class milieu. The opens the new middle class to new political appeals."

Detta är alltså ett argument om den nya medelklassen och att den befinner sig mellan kapital och arbete.

I stycket efter hävdar han rentav att expansionen av den högre utbildningen främjade mångfald, eller gjorde så att de gamla sociala miljöerna löstes upp. Hmm... snarare att den gamla medelklassmiljö expanderades och förnyades, skulle jag säga.

s. 5: Här beskrivs studentdemonstrationerna som "visible and violent indicators of political change". Var de egentligen det? Visst, det finns miljörörelsen och kvinnorörelsen. Men dessa sögs väl upp rätt fort (eller ja, på några decenniers sikt).

s. 6: En sammanfattning av de tre trender som bildar den nya medelklassen (även om de inte drar den slutsatsen).

s. 16: Refererar till The Affluent Worker och beskriver slutsatserna som de rakt motsatta vad de faktiskt är!

s. 16: "The forces of urbanization and occupational mobility are blurring traditional class and economic aligments. Some socially mobile individuals will change their adult class identifications to conform to their new contexts, while others will not. To the extent that individuals adhere to their early political training, class voting will decline. Moreover, as Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt point out, the growth of the middle class further obscures class lines (Baker et al., 1981, Kerr, forthcoming). The new middle class is in an ambiguous economic position. On the one hand, it is relatively affluent, but on the other, it shares some of the same problems as the working class, and increasingly seeks security in unionization. This ambiguous role has contributed to the decline in class voting in many advanced socieities. Thus social and occupational mobility also are weakening traditional class alignments."

s. 20: Nedgången i klassröstning beror på främst på ändrat beteende från medelklassens sida. Baker et al. 1981, Ladd and Hadley 1975, Kemp 1978, Lipset 1981a. Det är inte förändringar i arbetarklassen som driver förändringarna, hävdar de, utan förändringar inom medelklassen, t.ex. har den blivit mer liberal. Men är inte det en ganska naturlig följd av att de blivit fler, och blivit mer lika arbetarna i sina intressen?

s. 1: Man kan notera att Dalton et al börjar med att distansiera sig från Bell och tesen om ideologins slut. Kanske står hela moderniseringsteorin (i hans tappning) i konflikt med idén om postindustrialism. Inglehart och Dalton har ju fokus på nya politiska konflikter. Bell tyckte sig väl se att alla allvarliga politiska meningsskiljaktigheter var på väg att biläggas?

s. 16f: Faktorer som skapar rörlighet: arbetarklassens förborgerligande, social rörlighet, massamhället (som ger medelklassen dess större rörlighet), urbanisering och geografisk rörlighet

s. 16: "Growing social mobility means that a child's ultimate social placement is increasingly different from his/her parents. For instance, many farmers' children who had conservative political upbringings have moved into unionized, leftist, working-class contexts in the cities, while many working class children from urban, leftist  backgrounds have moved into conservative white-collar occupations (Stephens, 1981: 175; Hamilton, 1967). These forces of urbanization and occupational mobility are blurring traditional class and economic alignments. Some socially mobile individuals will change their adult class identifications to conform to their new contexts, while others will not. To the extent that individuals adhere to their early political training, class voting will decline. Moreover, as Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt point out, the growth of the new middle class further obscures class lines (Baker et al., 1981; Kerr, forthcoming). The new middle class is in an ambiguous economic position. On the one hand, it is relatively affluent, but on the other, it shares some of the same problems as the working class and increasingly seeks security in unionization. This ambiguous class role has contributed to the decline in class voting in many advanced industrial socieities."

De använder här inte medelklassen för att förklara ökande rörlighet, utan snarare sjunkande klassröstning. De påstår egentligen aldrig att medelklassen skulle vara särskilt rörliga. Man skulle å andra sidan kunna härleda en sådan sak ur deras teori.

s. 16-17: "The rapid socio-economic changes of the past decades presumably have eroded traditional group and institutional networks. The growth of the new middle class, for example, produced a large social stratum that is integrated into neither the bourgeois nor proletarian institutional structures. Geographic, social, and structural mobility has increased, and this has weakened primary group ties. The rapid expansion of the mass media has enticed the citizens away from personal networks for political information."

Här beskrivs medelklassen som speciell, som stående utanför etablerade strukturer. Kan man alltså säga att de tror på en generell ökning av rörligheten, men att den nya medelklassen torde vara särskilt drivande i denna? Och under rubriken "Mass Society Thesis" beskrivs detta som en del av förklaringen till förändringarna. Läs detta igen!

Kan man kanske säga att de föregriper Floridas tes om den urbana medelklassen när de (s. 18) talar om hur urbanisering och "residential mobility" skapar politisk rörlighet.