Bale, Tim (2008) European Politics, 2nd edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
s. 273: Within-country studies [...] also seem to show a relationship between left-wing governments and higher spending and conservative governments and lower spending, although the effect is confined to majority as opposed to minority governments and is influenced by the size and strength of the opposition (as well as the existence of a strong trade union movement).
Finns också olika prioriteringar i inflation-arbetslöshet och resultat i ekonomisk jämlikhet. Understryker dock att dessa skillnader är ganska små. Svaret ja på frågan om politik spelar roll är "cautious". Många påstår dock att den har minskat (s. 273).
(Här finns även (s. 274) en skaplig sätt att sammanfatta "tredje vägen" - eller iaf bilden av den.)
Refererar Allan & Scruggs (2004) och Korpi & Palme (2003) som båda slår fast att högerregeringar skär ned mer på welfare benefits och gör skillnad på fattigdomen (Allan & Scruggs 2004). "Both make a strong case for the continued importance of class-based political differences when it comes to welfare." (s. 276).
Hela kapitel 9 ägnas här åt denna fråga. Speciellt s. 271-283 åt just höger-vänsterskillnader.
James P. Allan och Lyle Scruggs "Political Partisanship and Welfare State Reform in Advanced Industrial Societies" American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 3, July 2004, Pp. 496–512
Allan och Scruggs har tagit fram ett dataset med ersättningsgrad i a-kassa och sjukförsäkring 1975-1999 för 18 länder. De finner följande (ur abstract):
Second, we examine the “end of partisanship” claim by estimating the effects of government partisanship on changes in income replacement rates in sickness and unemployment programs. Our results suggest that, contrary to claims that partisanship has little impact on welfare state commitments, traditional partisanship continues to have a considerable effect on welfare state entitlements in the era of retrenchment
Bruno Amable, Donatella Gatti och Jan Schumacher (2006) "Welfare-State Retrenchment: The Partisan Effect Revisited", s. 426-444 i Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 22 (3).
Dessa ekonomer använder delvis Allan och Scruggs dataset, och kompletterar detta med arbetsmarknadsdata från OECD samt politikdata (regeringsposition) från "the PGL File" sammanställt av Cusack och Engelhardt. De undersöker perioden 1981-1999 och kommer fram till följande (abstract):
Left-wing governments strengthen the positive effects of shocks on aggregate social expenditure, while right-wing governments undertake even stronger cutbacks in replacement rates as a reaction to structural change.
David Bradleya1, Evelyne Hubera2, Stephanie Mollera2, François Nielsena2 and John D. Stephensa2* "Distribution and Redistribution in Postindustrial Democracies"
Denna har inkomstfördelning snarare än välfärdsstaten som beroende variabel, och använder följande data: "pooled time-series data base on welfare state effort and its determinants assembled by Huber, Ragin, and Stephens (1997) with data on income distribution assembled in the Luxembourg Income Survey (IJS) archive." Det innebär att tidsperioden är lite olika för olika länder. Många går inte längre tillbaka än till 1980-talet. Sverige verkar vara det som går längst tillbaka, till 1965. IJS har inte heller data för varje år.
Resultatsammanfattningen i abstract ser ut så här:
Union density, unemployment, and percentage of female-headed households were the main determinants of pre—tax and transfer inequality (R2 = .64), while leftist government, directly and indirectly through its influence on the size of the welfare state, was found to be by far the strongest determinant of distribution (R2 = .81).
DAVID BRADY, Duke University "The Politics of Poverty: Left Political Institutions, the Welfare State, and Poverty" Social Forces, December 2003, 82(2):557-588.
These relationships are tested with an unbalanced panel analysis of 16 rich Western democracies from 1967 to 1997 (N = 73, 74), two measures of poverty, and eight measures of left political institutions. The results demonstrate that the strength of left political institutions has a significant, powerful negative impact on poverty. Specifically, left political institutions partially combine with andpartially channel through the welfare state. Voter turnout and thecumulative historical power of left parties entirely channel through the welfare state to reduce poverty. The percent of votes for left parties, the percent of seats for leftparties, wage coordination, neocorporatism, gross union density and employed union density partiallycombine with and partially channel through the welfare state to reduce poverty."Left political institutions" verkar vara en term B kontrasterar med "välfärdsstaten". Och det verkar i viss mån också gå utöver regeringsmakten. Däremot verkar denne inte uttala sig specifikt om den senare delen av perioden. Den generella teoretiska poängen är bara att institutioner spelar roll, typ.
Geoffrey Garrett (1998) Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle? , International Organization / Volume 52 / Issue 04 / September 1998, pp 787 - 824
En rätt omfattande artikel utan abstract, men i slutet sammanfattar G sina resultat på följande sätt: moderna globaliseringsteorier är väldigt lika de från artonhundratalet, och vi vet i efterhand att de senare teoriernas prediktioner inte har gått i uppfyllelse. Den andra poängen är följande:
My second point is that, up until the mid-1990s, globalization has not prompted a pervasive policy race to the neoliberal bottomamong the OECD countries, nor have governments that have persisted with interventionist policies invariably been hamstrung by damaging capital flight. (p. 823)Låter mycket Polanyi i slutorden:
As has been the case for more than two hundred years, the coupling of openness with domestic compensation remains a robust and desirable solution to the problem of reaping the efficiency benefits of capitalism while mitigating its costs in terms of social dislocations and inequality. (p. 824)
New Politics and Class Politics in the Context of Austerity and Globalization: Welfare State Regress in 18 Countries, 1975–95 WALTER KORPI and JOAKIM PALME, American Political Science Review Vol. 97, No. 3 August 2003, p. 425-446.
Korpi och Palme lanserade i denna artikel ett nytt SOFI-dataset, SCIP, med omfattande indikatorer på det sociala medborgarskapet. Dessa ska tydligen vara en revision av tidigare mått på retrenchment, men
Resultatsammanfattning i abstract, i polemik mot Pierson: "We argue that retrenchment can fruitfully be analyzed as distributive conflict involving a remaking of the early postwar social contract based on the full employment welfare state, a conflict in which partisan politics and welfare-state institutions are likely to matter. Pointing to problems of conceptualization and measurement of the dependent variable in previous research, we bring in new data on the extent of retrenchment in social citizenship rights and show that the long increase in social rights has been turned into a decline and that significant retrenchment has taken place in several countries. Our analyses demonstrate that partisan politics remains significant for retrenchment also when we take account of contextual indictors [min kursivering], such as constitutional veto points, economic factors, and globalization."
Hyeok Yong Kwon and Jonas Pontusson "Globalization, labour power and partisan
politics revisited", Socio-Economic Review (2010) 8, 251–281
Kwon och Pontussons paper refereras mer utförligt av Erik Bengtsson här. De använder data från OECD, Cusack ("Cabinet Centre of Gravity"), Dreher om globalisering.
Abstract:
This paper explores temporal variation in partisan effects on social spending growth in OECD countries over the period 1971–2002. We argue that partisan effects are jointly conditioned by globalization and the mobilizational capacity of organized labour. We present three main empirical findings. First, we show that partisan effects increased from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s and then disappeared in the 1990s. Second, we show that partisan effects rose with globalization in the 1970s and early 1980s, a period characterized by rising labour strength in many OECD countries, but this is not true for the post-1990 period, characterized by declining labour strength. Third, we show that globalization was associated with declining partisan effects in countries that experienced union decline in the 1980s and 1990s, but it was associated with rising partisan effects in countries in which unions remained strong.
Mikael Nygård (2006) Welfare-Ideological Change in Scandinavia: A Comparative Analysis
of Partisan Welfare State Positions in Four Nordic Countries, 1970–2003. Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 29 – No. 4, 2006
Nygård är antagligen någon som jag borde läsa mer av och ha kontakt med. Här analyseras valmanifestdata som jämförs med opinionsdata. Alltså jämförelser mellan väljare och partier över tid.
Abstract: The results indicate a relatively high degree of stability in partisan support for welfare state expansion and investments in social justice, while market-type solutions to social problems, on the other hand, have become more salient among parties, especially in the Right. The findings suggest that parties still differ from each other as to welfare-political positions, indicating that Social Democratic and left-wing parties remain the foremost defenders of the ‘Nordic Welfare Model’, whereas the Right has become more hesitant towards welfare state expansion.
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